Disinflation has stalled: implications for the second half
The IMF has revised 2026 global inflation up three times running, from 3.8 to 4.4 to 4.7 percent. Three revisions in one direction is a signal about the model, not the shock.
Shorter notes published close to events and retained as published. Where a prior assessment was not supported by subsequent data, the original note remains available and the correction is stated in the following one.
The IMF has revised 2026 global inflation up three times running, from 3.8 to 4.4 to 4.7 percent. Three revisions in one direction is a signal about the model, not the shock.
US residential electricity prices rose roughly twice as fast in 2025 as in prior years, and faster still in early 2026. The data centre link is no longer speculative.
The February decision removed one layer of a four-layer schedule. Importers who modelled a single average rate are now discovering how much the composition mattered.
Brent went from 71 dollars on 27 February to above 100 within a fortnight. The interesting question is not the level. It is how much of it reaches core inflation, and how quickly.
Four companies guided to roughly 630 billion dollars of 2026 capital spending in a single earnings week, a 62 percent increase on a record year. The technology question is well covered. The macro question is not.
Agricultural total factor productivity now grows at 0.76 percent a year against a 2 percent requirement. That is not a rounding error. It is a structural change in how the food system meets demand.
World merchandise trade held up far better in 2025 than the tariff arithmetic suggested it should. Two effects explain almost all of the gap, and both of them reverse.
Everyone agrees housing is unaffordable. Far fewer agree on which side of the market broke. The quantity data is more useful than the price data, and it points somewhere specific.